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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by Judge Leslie A. Lewis in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
on J a n u a r y 24, 1994. That judgment incorporated the court's memorandum
decision entered September 22, 1993, which granted the appellee's (hereinafter
referred to as "Dalton") request for additur. That judgment also sets forth the
court's ruling regarding an award of costs to Dalton. The court's judgment is
appealed as of right p u r s u a n t to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue:

Did the lower court err in granting Dalton's motion for

additur on the grounds that the j u r y made findings clearly against the
evidence and the verdict was outside the limits of any reasonable appraisal of
damages as shown by the evidence?
Standard:

The court is "obliged to survey the evidence" and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's
finding. Bodon v. Suhrmanix 327 P.2d 826, 829 (Utah 1958); Pratt v. Prodata,
Inc., 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06
(Utah 1993); State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Utah 1992).
A reviewing court will defer to a jury's damage award unless the award
indicated that the jury disregarded competent evidence, or that the award is
so excessive or inadequate beyond rational justification as to indicate the
effect of improper factors in the determination, or that it clearly appears that
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the award was rendered under a misunderstanding.
Johnson Construction Company,
Issue:

Bennion

v. LeGrand

701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985).

Did the lower court appropriately award Dalton costs in

light of the appellant's (hereinafter referred to as "Herold") offer of judgment
and the appropriate statutes and case law on the issue of taxable costs?
Standard:

The trial court's award of costs is reviewed under an abuse

of discretion standard.
1980); Lloyds

Frampton

v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-774 (Utah

Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512

(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEDURES
AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
On J u n e 11, 1992, Dalton filed a complaint against Herold, asserting that
on "October 15, 1990, [Dalton] was riding his motorcycle northbound on 900
West in Salt Lake City, Utah. [Herold] carelessly and recklessly made a lefthand turn in front of [Dalton] from the southbound traffic lane causing a
collision." (R. 2-5)

Dalton claimed that he suffered certain personal injuries

with associated past and future medical expenses.

On May 5, 1993, and

p u r s u a n t to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Herold filed an
offer of judgment in the amount of $15,000. (R. 62-64) That offer was rejected
by Dalton and this matter was tried to a jury on May 17 through 19, 1993.
Shortly after the automobile/motorcycle accident in question, Dalton
was incarcerated.

Later, Dalton entered a plea of guilty to the third degree

felony of burglary.

Prior to trial, the parties agreed that Dalton would not
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make any claims for lost wages or any reference to how his physical
limitations relate to employment in exchange for Herold not attempting to
introduce evidence regarding Dalton's incarceration or criminal record. (R.373)
Accordingly, the jury did not address any issues of whether Dalton could
afford to obtain proper medical care or, in fact, receive free medical care while
in jail.
After the conclusion of the evidence at trial, the court directed the jury
to find that Herold was negligent. The remaining issues were submitted to the
jury on a special verdict form to answer special interrogatories.

The jury

found Dalton to have been negligent and both parties' negligence to be a
proximate cause of Dalton's injuries. The jury concluded that Dalton was 20%
at fault and that Herold was 80% at fault. Finally, the jury awarded special
damages in the a m o u n t of $3,000 and general damages in the amount of
$5,000. (R. 292)
On May 27, 1993, Dalton filed his verified memorandum of costs and
disbursements and a motion for additur a n d / o r new trial with a supporting
memorandum. (R. 358, 377) Dalton's memorandum and motion were opposed
by Herold.

(R. 387, 394)

regarding those issues.

On August 10, 1993, the court heard argument
On September 27, 1993, the court issued a

memorandum decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "AM. (R.
433) On J a n u a r y 24, 1994, the court entered its final judgment and order
regarding plaintiffs post-trial motion for verified costs and expenses, copies of
which are attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C". (R. 452, 455)
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The trial court found the a m o u n t of the jury's verdict to be "clearly
inadequate in light of the evidence presented at the trial" and "not consistent
with any actual special damages." Dal ton's motion for additur was granted
and the court increased the award of special damages from the jury's verdict
of $3,000.00 to a total of $22,910.24. The court did not alter the jury's verdict
which found Dalton 20% at fault for his own injuries or the award of
$5,000.00 in general damages.
The trial court awarded Dalton $3,124.40 in costs, expenses and interest.
Herold contended t h a t because of the plaintiffs rejection of the offer of
judgment no award of costs should be granted to Dalton or, in the alternative,
that such an award should not include travel expenses incurred for the taking
of the depositions of Dalton and Herold of $573.00, the court reporter fee for
the deposition of Newell Knight of $188.90 (Knight was not called as a witness
at trial), or the witness fees paid to Knight and Dr. Stadler of $525.00. It was
further contested that the service fees were inflated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On October 15, 1990, immediately prior to the accident, Herold

was the second car stopped at a red light at the intersection of 900 West and
North Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 611)
2.

Herold was facing south and intending to make a left-hand turn.

(R. 612)
3.

At the time of the accident, the traffic signals at the intersection

in question did not provide a left-hand turn arrow.
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4.

Dalton was northbound on his motorcycle on 900 West. (R. 640)

5.

Dalton was not wearing a protective helmet.

(Dalton has never

worn a helmet while riding his motorcycle.) (R. 684)
6.

As soon as the light turned green, Herold followed the vehicle in

front of him in making a left-hand turn. (R. 680)
7.

While approaching the intersection, Dalton had actually seen the

green light for approximately four to six seconds before he passed the
beginning of the left-hand turn lane for northbound traffic. (R. 677-678)
8.

Dalton had a clear view of Herold and the car ahead of Herold.

(R 680)
9.

In attempting to stop, Dalton claimed to have locked u p his

brakes, yet no skid marks were left by his motorcycle. (R. 680-681)
10.

Dalton hit the very end of the Herold vehicle on its right rear

quarter panel. (R. 685)
11.

At the scene of the accident, Dalton refused medical aid. (R. 685-

12.

Later on the day of the accident, Dalton was treated at the

686)

emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital and released on the same day.
(October 15, 1990).
13.

While at the emergency room, Dalton did not wish to have a

plastic surgeon consulted. (R. 240, p. 2 of Holy Cross emergency department
report)
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14.

Dalton was next examined by Dr. J a m e s Morgan, an orthopedic

surgeon, almost two months later on December 6, 1990. (R. 748-749)
15.

Dr. Morgan saw Dalton only one other time on J a n u a r y 24, 1991;

by that time Dalton's knee injury had returned to about pre-injury level,
although he continued to have numbness of his face, right arm and hand. (R.
756)
16.

Dalton saw Dr. Richard Hodnett, a plastic surgeon, on only one

occasion on December 17, 1990, no treatment was rendered. (R. 766)
17.

Dr. Hodnett asked Dalton to return; Dalton did not return.

(R.784)
18.

It is the policy of Dr. Hodnett's office to "call and ask the patient

to come in for a repeat exam." (R. 785)
19.

In December of 1990, Dr. Hodnett "thought that, at that late of

date, [Dalton] may need more extensive treatment than he would have needed
if [Dr. Hodnett had] seen him within the first couple weeks of when [the
accident] happened." (R. 769)
20.

When asked at trial whether Dalton needed surgery approximately

two and one-half years after Dr. Hodnett last saw Dalton and had x-rays
taken, Dr. Hodnett stated: "It's difficult, since I haven't been able to examine
Mr. Dalton". (R. 781)
21.

Dalton received no treatment from any of the physicians who

examined him (Dr. Morgan, Dr. Hodnett, Dr. Cosby, Dr. Mikesell, and Dr.
Stadler) for his alleged injuries related to the accident in question.
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(R. 696)

22.

Dalton did not follow his doctors' recommendations which would

have mitigated his damages. (R. 702)
23.

When Dalton saw Dr. Michael P. Cosby on December 16, 1991 for

his temporal mandibular joint concerns, Dalton had one tooth actually rotted
down to the roots. (R. 827-28)
24.

When Dalton saw Dr. L. Vaun Mikesell, his second expert in the

area of oral and maxillofacial surgery, shortly before trial on February 23,
1993, Dalton had eight teeth that had severe cavities and may need to be
extracted. (R. 858)
25.

In a letter to Dalton's attorney dated December 26, 1991, Dr.

Cosby recommended that Dalton have his teeth cleaned. (R. 849)
26.

Dalton did not follow the recommendation to have his teeth

cleaned. (R. 702)
27.

Dr. Cosby recommended that Dalton exercise appropriate dental

hygiene. (R. 849)
28.

Dalton "just turned lazy" and did not exercise appropriate dental

hygiene. (R. 702)
29.

Dr. Cosby recommended the removal of non-restored teeth and the

restoration of restorable teeth. (R. 849)
30.

Dalton did not obtain appropriate dental care. (R. 702)

31.

Dr. Cosby recommended that Dalton be evaluated for splint

therapy. (R. 849)
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32.

Dalton did not follow through in being evaluated for splint

therapy. (R 702)
33.

It was Dr. Cosby's "feeling conservative treatment would be all

that would be needed. Most likely, splint therapy would alleviate most of the
myalgia and symptoms of TMJ dysfunction which [Dalton] is experiencing." (A
copy of Dr. Cosby's letter is attached as Exhibit "D".)
34.

Dr. Mikesell testified that splint therapy would cost "around $300

to $400." (R. 834)
35.

Dalton did not obtain splint therapy when recommended by Dr.

Cosby and his TMJ condition became worse. (R. 838)
36.

When Dalton was examined by Dr. Cosby, Dalton's mouth opening

was in the range of normal. (R. 845)
37.

When Dalton was examined by Dr. Cosby, there was no clicking or

popping of the jaw to palpation. (R. 846)
38.

It did not appear from Dr. Mikesell's examination t h a t Dalton

followed any of the recommendations set forth by Dr. Cosby. (R. 850)
39.

Even at the time of trial, Dr. Mikesell would begin treatment

conservatively and only if the patient does not respond would surgery be
considered. (R. 850)
40.

Dr. Cosby's bill to Dalton's attorney was $ 6 5 . 0 0 for the

examination and $200 for the report sent to Dalton's attorney; the report is an
expense of litigation, not a medical bill. (R. 240, Dr. Cosby's itemization of
charges and payments.)
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41.

Dalton's past medical expenses equal $2,703.24, which represents

II $2,903.24 figure presented by Dalton at trial, less $200 for Dr. Cosby's
report to Dalton's attorney.
12
treati ii

If one were to add $300.00 for conservative splint therapy
re special damages to the past medical special damages, the

total special damage figure would be within $3.24 of the jury's special damagi
award of $3,000.00.
r h e plaintiff was examined by Dr. E. Warren Stadler, an expert in
the area of physical rehabilitation, on February 22, 1993. (R. 864)
44.

At the time of Dr. Stadler's examination, Dalton had a full range
the cervical spine without weakness in the upper extremity or the

neck area. (R. 869)
45.

Dr. Stadler's examination found decreased sensation in Dalton's

right index finger and on the right facial area around the right eye. (R. 869,
872)
46.
4r

Dalton's loss of sensation is caused by a nerve problem. (R. 873)
, Stadler's examination found Dalton's facial fractures to be

well healed. (R. 872)
48.

Dr. Stadler did not place any limitation on Dalton's activities of

daily living. (R. 873)
49.

Dr. Stadler did not feel that surgical intervention on Dalton

would be helpful with regard to his knee, his neck, his shoulder, his arm or
with regard to his facial injuries. (R. 872-872)
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50.

Surgery would not be helpful in reestablishing the sensory

patterns for nerve problems experienced by Dalton. (R. 873)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The jury's award of damages was consistent with the testimony of the
witnesses at trial. The medical expenses established were $2,703.24, plus the
cost of conservative treatment which was estimated at $300.00. The j u r y
awarded a total of $3,000.00. There was a reasonable basis for this award.
Sufficient evidence was produced that the jury could correctly decide
that Dalton had failed to mitigate his damages.

He had not received any

medical treatment and had not followed through with any of his doctors'
recommendations.
The jury was presented with credible evidence at trial rebutting Dalton's
allegations t h a t future surgeries would be required. The jury had sufficient
evidence to decide that future surgeries would not be required . The court
finding that $20,007.00 for future medical expenses had been undisputed was
in error.
Dalton was extended a reasonable offer of judgment prior to trial. The
jury's award was less than that offer.
awarded costs.

Accordingly, Dalton should not be

In the alternative, the cost award should be modified in

accordance with statute.
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ARGUMENT
I
BECAUSE THE DAMAGES AWARDED DALTON BY THE JURY WERE NOT SO
INADEQUATE AS TO INDICATE A DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE BY THE
JURY, THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT EMPOWERED TO GRANT A MOTION FOR
ADDITUR.

After the jury awarded Dalton $3,000 for special damages ai.u ^
general damages as a result of the automobile/motorcycle accident
question, Dalton moved the court for additur or new trial pursuant to Rule
59(a)(5), (6) and (7). Dalton maintains that the damages were inadequate and
appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, that
the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, and that the verdict was
against the law or an error in the law. The trial court was persuaded that
j u r y verdict was "inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial" and
granted "the motion for additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special
damages." (Memorandum Decision dated September 22, 1993, P. 1 I The trial
court further stated:
The award for special damages m u s t bear a reasonable
relationship to the evidence. This court finds that the
award of $3,000 does not bear this reasonable relationship
to the evidence adduced at trial. The plaintiff presented
evidence that his p a s t medical bills were $2,903.24 (See
Exhibit "3"); and an award of $3,000, while close to this
amount, it is greater than the actual past medical expenses,
and not consistent with any actual special damages. An
additur is therefore granted.
{Id. at p.3.)
Dalton's exhibit summarizing his medical bills indicated: $ l , 2 3 r

examination, x-rays, CT scans and stitches at Holy Cross Hospital on the day
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of the accident, October 15, 1990; $328.47 for x-rays and CT scans by Valley
Radiologists also on the day of the accident, October 15, 1990; (Over one-half
of the plaintiffs actual past special damages were incurred on the day of the
accident.

$l,561.24/$2,703.24.);

$ 1 1 5 . 0 0 for extended

consultation,

examination and x-rays by Dr. Richard Hodnett on December 5, 1990; $192.00
for consultation and examination by Dr. William Bentley on May 16, 1991;
$540.00 for EMG study by Dr. Karl Gross on May 20, 1991; $95.00 for
consultation, examination and x-rays by Dr. Marc Schwartz on J u n e 25, 1991;
$265.00 for TMJ consultation and report by Dr. Michael Cosby on December
16, 1991; and $135.00 for TMJ exam and x-ray by Dr. L. Vaun Mikesell on
February 23, 1993. (R. 240, medical bills and treatment summary for Dalton.)
It was pointed out to the jury that Dr. Cosby's bill dated May 12, 1993
for services performed on December 16, 1991, was for a TMJ consultation fee of
$65.00 and a narrative report or Dr. Cosby's letter to Dalton's attorney of
$200.00. (R. 1001). The letter to Dalton's attorney is a cost of litigation and
should be subtracted from the plaintiffs total medical expenses of $2,903.24,
leaving the actual total of the plaintiffs past special damages at $2,703.24.
This court must "view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to [the jury's] verdict." Pratt v. Prodata,
Inc., 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994). There is no question that Dalton
failed to follow through with his treating physicians. In fact, from the time of
the accident to the time of trial, Dalton received no actual treatment from any
medical provider. In that light, a jury could have reasonably inferred from Dr.
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Stadler's testimony that Dalton would not have benefited at the time of trial
In 11 II my surgical intervention with regard to Dalton's knee, neck, shoulder,
arm and face. The jury could have also reasonably inferred from Di Ci osby's
letter of December 26, 1991, to Dalton's attorney that splint therapy and
"conservative treatment would be all that would be needed to resolve Dalton's
TMJ symptoms." Conservative treatment, on the low end, would cost Daltoi1
$300.
"When the damages are not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of
the evidence by the jury, a court is not empowt
additur."
added ]

Dupuis

to entertain a mutii m li m

v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981).

(Emphasis

the recent case of Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 246 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4

(Utah 1994), the Supreme Court of Utah stated:
We dispose of defendants' sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims
by adhering to a well-established principle of appellate
review: This court will upset a jury verdict 'only upon a
showing that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor
of the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on
the outcome of the case.' [EA. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc.
v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 13201, 1322 (Utah 1983);
accord Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758
(Utah 1984).] The burden on an appellant to establish that
the evidence does not support the jury's verdict and the
factual findings implicit in that verdict ... is quite heavy.'
[Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah
1987).] To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant
m u s t marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and
then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is not
sufficient to support it.' [Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,
769 (Utah 1985) (citing Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985)).]
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There is no question that "the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict" support a finding
of p a s t special damages in the amount of $2,703.24, and future special
damages in the amount of $300.00. Clearly, the jury's award of $3,000 for
special damages bears "a reasonable relationship to the evidence."
The damages awarded by the jury to Dalton are not so inadequate "as
to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the jury." McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co.,
62 Utah 115, 129, 218 P.98, 104 (1923); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah
1983). Accordingly, the jury's verdict, not the trial court's additur, should
stand.

n.
THE JURY CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED THAT DALTON FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES

The basis of the court's order that $19,910.24 should be added to the
jury's award of $3,000 in special damages was that such an amount in medical
care "more probably than not will be required and given in the future."

(Jury

Instruction No. 44. R. 343.) The court found the amount of $20,007 for future
medical expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at trial. (R.
435) Apparently, the court was also convinced that the care would be "given
in the future." That medical expense figure represented the cost of two future
surgeries. One of the surgeries was testified to by Dr. Hodnett and would be
performed in an effort "to release either scar tissue or bony fragments from the
nerve to attempt to recover some of the sensation" lost in Dalton's face.

14

(R.

782)

The second surgery was testified to by Dr. Mikesell and would be

intended to assist Dalton with his TMJ symptoms.
Ai the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed regarding cn^itil
damages. J u r y Instruction No. 44 states:
IUU may award special damages, if proven, for the
reasonable value of medical care, services and supplies
reasonably required and actually given in treatment of the
plaintiff and the reasonable value of similar items that more
probably than not will be required and given in the future.
(R 313) That instruction clearly directs the jury to award special damages for
future medical treatment only if they are persuaded that DaltoiI
and be given the treatment.

Accordingly, Dalton's "track record" of ignoring

1lis physicians' recommendations and failing to receive treatment is insightful,
if not, critical.
The law also requires a plaintiff to mitigate his damages. The jury was
directed

Jury Instruction No. 36 as follows:
It is the duty of a person who has been injured to use
r e a s o n a b l e diligence in caring for the injuries and
reasonable m e a n s to prevent their aggravation and to
accomplish healing.
When an injured person does not use reasonable
diligence to care for the injuries, and they are aggravated as
a result of such failure, the liability, if any, of another whose
act or omission was a proximate cause of the original injury,
m u s t be limited to the amount of damage that would have
been suffered if the injured person had exercised the
required diligence.
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FACIAL INJURIES

Dalton was not wearing a helmet at the time his motorcycle c< ilided
with the rear-end of Herold's car. (R. 684) Dalton suffered facial injuries as a
result of that accident. Immediately after the accident, Dalton refused medical
aid.

(R. 685) The police took Dalton to his home and later some friends took

Dalton to Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 687) Dalton was at Holy Cross Hospital,
on the day of the accident, for approximately two and one-half to three hours.
(R. 688)

Much of the time at the hospital was spent lying on a cot without

being examined. (R. 689) At that time, Dalton "did not wish to have a plastic
surgeon consulted."

(R. 240; Holy Cross Emergency Room record dated

10/15/90)
Dalton was also examined by CT scans and x-rays at the hospital.
Nothing other than diagnostic testing was performed.

No treatment was

received by Dalton. (R. 689)
Dalton was next examined by Dr. Hodnett on December 17, 1990, over
two months after the accident.

(R. 766) The failure to receive care within the

first couple of weeks of the accident may have caused Dalton's condition to
worsen and may have lead to Dalton needing "more extensive treatment". (R.
769)

Dalton was only seen and diagnosed by Dr. Hodnett on that one

occasion and no treatment was performed.

After his only visit, Dalton was

told by Dr. Hodnett to return. Dalton failed to do so. (R. 784) Dalton never
saw Dr. Hodnett again. The jury was clearly instructed that if Dalton failed
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to care for his injuries, Herold could not be liable for the fact that the injuries
^rsened.
When Dalton was examined shortly before trial on February ?:.?, (993,
Dalton's facial fractures were well-healed. (R. 841, 872) The only deficit in the
that "his sensation was decreased around the right facial area
around the right eye when compared to the left." (R. 872) That pi oblen I \ i a s
diagnosed by the only doctor, Dr. Stadler, to have examined Dalton's facial
> months.
Apparently, the jury did not award future damages for JXIIUMI'S (anal
injuries.
(\il

In viewing the evidence most favorable to the jury's

verdict, the

i Iraih supports a finding that Dalton's fractures were well-healed at

the time of trial and that his only deficit as a result of those fra< h u e s was a
very minor one. In fact, Dr. Stadler testified that Dalton would experience no
day-to-day limitation as a result of the decreased sensation around his right
eye.
To successfully attack the verdict, [the party attacking
verdict] m u s t marshall all the evidence supporting
verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing
evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict,
evidence is insufficient to support it.
Von 11ake v. Thomas

the
the
the
the

at 769. It is impossible for Dalton to meet his burden as

set forth above for the simple fact that the evidence in this case strongly
supports the jury's verdict.
I'M,i ^ V ' M P i O M S

When Dalton was examined in the emergency department at Holy Cross
Hospital on the day of the accident on October 15, 1990, he denied "any neck
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pain, or any other pain, except that he scraped his left knee which is
significant for reconstructive surgery (although it does not feel painful at this
time.)"

(R. 240, Holy Cross Emergency Room record dated 10/15/90)

On

examination of his facial injuries at the emergency room, there was no palpc le
bony fracture, although he was very tender over the zygomatic arch, and there
was some soft tissue swelling and tenderness over the maxilla on the right
side. His oral cavity was unremarkable.
Dalton had a tender "TMJ" when examined by Dr. Hodnett on December
17, 1990.

Dalton was first seen, however, by an oral and maxillofacial

surgeon, Dr. Michael P. Cosby, in Denver, Colorado one year later on December
16, 1991. When Dalton saw Dr. Cosby, he "presented with a chief complaint of
pain with chewing and popping of the jaws." His pain, which was experienced
on a daily basis lasting 30 to 60 seconds, was on the right side only. In a
letter to Dalton's attorney, Dr. Cosby diagnosed Dalton as having "internal
derangement of the TMJ on the right," and recommended conservative splint
therapy treatment.

It was Dr. Cosby's "feeling conservative treatment would

be all that would be needed" regarding Dalton's TMJ dysfunction.
In anticipation of trial, Dalton's attorney arranged to have Dalton
examined by another oral and maxillofacial surgeon, Dr. Vaun Mikesell, on
February 22, 1993.

A comparison of Dr. Cosby's and Dr. Mikesell's

examinations shows Dalton's unwillingness to care for his own health and his
continued iuilure to follow-through with his doctors' recommendations.
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It

was clear to the jury that Herold should not be liable for Dalton allowing his
nattended.
ihe time of Dr. Cosby's examination, Dalt
opening within the range of normal of 44 millimeters.

That opening was

mllimeters with a strain and 25 millimeters without straining
when he was seen by Dr. Mikesell. (R. 838, 845)

Cosby found Daltoi

have a normal occlusion on the right and an abnormal occlusion on the left.
Mikesell ionn J an abnormal occlusiori oiI both sides and Dalton indicated
to Dr. Mikesell that Dalton had had a recent change in his bite.
Cosby noted a negative finding for clicking, popping or crepitus.

\ positive

I ii in in 1114 v 'us made by Dr. Mikesell. (R. 837)
Dalton's personal dental hygiene was lacking to say the least

I

example, in December of 1991, Dalton had only one tooth that was decayed
dowi

^ root such that it should be extracted.

In February of 1993,

Dalton had at least six teeth in such a condition. Dalton simply did not care
about his own personal needs or following his doctors' orders. At trial on May
17, 1993, Dalton testified in response to questioning by counsel for Herold, in
part, as follows:
Q:

I see.

When you were brought over [to Utah

from Colorado] at my expense to see Dr. Stadler, did you not
also take advantage of that time and see Dr. Mikesell for the
first and only time?
A:

Yes, sir.
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Q:

Only time you ever saw Dr. Mikesell?

A:

That was the first time.

Q:

Did Dr. Mikesell treat you in any regard?

A:

No. He did a thorough exam.

Q:

So again, you had more diagnostic examination

without treatment?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Have you received any of the treatment that Dr.

Mikesell recommended on February 23, 1993?
A:

No, I haven't.

Q:

At that time, Dr. Mikesell recommended that you

have all six or seven of these rotten teeth extracted.

Have

you had that done?
A

No, I haven't.

9

Have you had a teeth cleaning?

A

No, I haven't.

Q

Have you been instructed

on proper

oral

hygiene?
A:

Yes, I have.

9

Who instructed you?

A

That would be back in Colorado with a Dr.

Cosby.
Q:

So Dr. Cosby did, in fact, do the instructions?
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Ai

Yes, originally.

Q:

But you didn't follow those instructions, did

A:

For a while, sir.

Q:

How long?

A:

I would say about nine months.

Q:

And then you went back to patterns of not

you?

ishing your teeth?
A:

Yes. Well, not the flossing part, and ti le 1 lea \ >

part, I quit doing that. I still brush my teeth.
Q:

All right. So if Dr. Mikesell were to testify that

it didn't appear from his examination that you followed
with any good oral hygiene, would that surprise you?
A:

No, it wouldn't.

Q:

So you would agree that you did not change

and have good oral hygiene after your meeting with Dr.
Cosby?
A:

It started looking better, and then I j u s t turned

lazy on it.
Q:

Okay.

So you didn't have the teeth extracted,

didn't have a teeth cleaning.

Did you have conservative

treatment for the TMJ problem, the splint therapy?
A:

No, I didn't.
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Q:

I'm j u s t checking what else he recommended.

Did you have any of your teeth fixed, those in addition to
the ones t h a t had rotted down to the root, did you have
fillings or anything placed in those?
A:

No, sir.

(R. 700-702)
There is no doubt that the evidence supports the jury's finding that
Dalton failed to mitigate his damages with respect to his TMJ symptoms. In
fact, Dr. Mikesell

directly testified on that point in examination at trial by

Dalton's attorney.
Q:

Now, if somebody has a damage to their TMJ

joint, say on October 15th of 1990, if that is not treated,
either by splint therapy or surgery, can the condition
become worse?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Do you think that happened in this case?

A:

I believe it did, yes.

(R 838)
The failure to obtain appropriate t r e a t m e n t and the s u b s e q u e n t
worsening of conditions falls squarely on the shoulders of Dalton.

In

December of 1991, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, Dr. Cosby, opined that
Dalton only needed conservative splint therapy treatment for the TMJ injuries
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allegedly resulting from the accident in question. The cost of that treatment is
between $300 and $400.

(R. 834) Any future complications would have been

avoided had Dalton simply followed through with the recommendations of his
physician.

m
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRAIL REBUTTING DALTON'S
ALLEGATIONS THAT FUTURE SURGERIES WILL BE REQUIRED

In justifying the need to award the plaintiff an additur, the court stated
in its memorandum decision:
This court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical
expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at
trial. During the trial, Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo
Vaun Mikesell, expert witnesses called by the plaintiff,
testified that the amount of future medical expenses, if
surgery occurred (and they both perceived surgery as
necessary) would be, at least, $20,007.00. Although the
defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness, evidence
of the cost of the plaintiffs special damages was not
disputed.
(R 435)
The trial court, however, in its review of the evidence apparently ignored
the contrary credible evidence testified to by Dr. Stadler and documented by
Dr. Cosby that future surgeries would not be necessary. Because there was
evidence that the surgeries were not necessary, the cost of those surgeries
need not be disputed.
FACIAL INJURIES

Dr. Hodnett's first and only examination of Dalton took place on
December 17, 1990. The next physician to examine the plaintiffs facial injuries
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was Dr. Stadler on February 22, 1993. Three months later at trial, Dr. Stadler
testified regarding Dalton's facial injuries and the need for surgery regarding
those injuries:
Q:

Now, with regard to [Dalton's] facial injuries,

what was your examination of the facial injuries?
A:

It would have been palpation around the face,

feeling of the face at the site of the injury.
Q:

Now, with that, do you have an opinion as to

how well-healed this individual was with regard to the
fractures he experienced in his face?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And what was that opinion?

A:

I feel that the fractures would be well-healed.

Q:

Did you feel that there would be a need at the

time for any type of surgical intervention with regard to the
facial fractures?
A:

No, I would not.

Q:

Now, you did find -- please respond to whether

you found any deficit in the face.
A:

I'm

going

to

look

back

at

the

clinical

examination. I felt that his sensation was decreased around
the right facial area around the right eye when compared to
the left.
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Q:

How would t h a t place a limitation on this

individual, if at all, on day-to-day living?
A:

On activities of daily living, I would not see any

limitations.
Q:

What would be the cause of the loss of

sensation? Is it a nerve problem, or what would that be?
A:

It would be a nerve problem.

Q:

Would surgery assist in correcting the nerve

problem?
Mr. Waddoups: Objection, foundation, your honor.
The court:
Q:

Sustained.

(By Mr. Dunn)

Do you have an opinion as to

whether surgery would assist in any regard, with regard to
the nerve problem in the face?
Mr. Waddoups:

Objection, foundation.

We don't

know if this person's qualified to do surgery.
The court: This question can be answered yes or no.
Q:

(By Mr. Dunn)

Do you have an opinion as to

whether surgery would be helpful?
A:

Surgery would not be helpful.

Mr. Waddoups:

Objection, that was a yes or no

question.
The court:

Sustained. The answer will be stricken.
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Q:

(By Mr. Dunn)

J u s t answer if you have an

opinion as to whether it would be helpful or not.
A:

Yes.

Q:

Yes, you have an opinion.

And what is that

opinion based on? What background do you have to come
to that opinion?
A:

Well, my background is physical medicine and

rehabilitation.

It deals with people that have had nerve

injury, both spinal cord, peripheral nerve injuries, meaning,
by peripheral, I mean nerves that are outside of the spinal
cord.

That would be facial nerves, that would be nerves,

sensory nerves that are in the upper or lower extremities, or
in the face.
Q:

So then I would like to ask that next question.

Why, is it, then -- what is your opinion as to whether
surgery would be helpful with regard to the nerve damage in
the face?
Mr. Waddoups: Objection, your honor. We still don't
have foundation as to his qualifications as a surgeon.
would like to voir dire the witness as to that.
The court: You may voir dire.
Mr. Waddoups:

Dr. Stadler, are you a surgeon?

The witness:

No, I am not a surgeon.
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I

Mr. Waddoups:

Do you perform surgery?

The witness:

No, I do not perform surgery.

Mr. Waddoups:

If surgery is indicated, you refer

patients to a surgeon?
The witness:

That is correct.

Mr. Waddoups:

Your honor, I renew my objection.

The court:

I believe it goes to the weight,

versus the admissibility.

The objection is overruled, you

may answer the question if you remember it, if not, counsel
will put it to you again.
Mr. Dunn: Thank you, your honor.
Q:

(By Mr. Dunn)

What is your opinion as to

whether surgery would be necessary or helpful in regard to
the nerve injury in the face?
A:

My opinion is that surgery would not be helpful.

Q:

And why is that?

A:

Because there's been, number one, a length of

time with regard to the injury, there are different types of
nerve injuries, called a transsection of the nerve, there
would also be a crushing injury of the nerve. The length of
time in this case, I do not feel that surgery would be helpful
in reestablishing the sensory pattern on this gentleman's
face.
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Q:

What does regeneration of a nerve mean?

A:

Regeneration means the nerve grows back.

Q:

Can a nerve, after this length of time, from an

accident back in 1990 of October to the present time, could
the nerve regenerate?
A:

Medical probability at this time would speak

against that.
(R. 872-876)
In Jensen

v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
The award of damages may be less than the plaintiff wished
or even less t h a n we would have found had we been the
jury; but it is the prerogative of the j u r y to make the
determination of damages and we cannot substitute our
judgment for t h a t of the fact finder unless the evidence
compels a finding that reasonable men and women would, of
necessity, come to a different conclusion.
The jury in this case was presented with evidence from a physician the court
allowed to testify that Dalton's facial injuries would not benefit from surgical
intervention. Accordingly, the courts should not substitute their judgment for
that of the finder of fact and add to the special damages awarded by the jury.
The evidence presented at trial does not support "a finding that reasonable
men and women would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion."
TMJ SYMPTOMS

It is truly uncontroverted that Dalton's first oral and maxillofacial
surgeon, Dr. Cosby, was of the opinion that Dalton's TMJ symptoms would be
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corrected by conservative splint therapy. No one will ever know whether Dr.
Cosby w a s correct b e c a u s e

Dalton

completely ignored

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s regarding his dental and TMJ care.

Dr.

Cosby's

Dr. Cosby's

correspondence to Dalton's attorney, standing alone, directly rebuts Dalton's
allegation t h a t future surgery on his temporal mandibular joint will be
required.
Dr. Cosby's opinion is bolstered yet further by Dr. Mikesell's own
testimony when questioned at trial regarding his own treatment plan for
Dalton:
Q:

What was your treatment plan for Mr. Dalton?

A:

I would have probably started him out on a soft

diet, heat, massage, and probably some medications, and an
occlusal splint to see if that would help relieve the joint
symptoms.
(R. 833-834) ...
Q:

Now, would you please tell the j u r y what

recommendations Dr. Cosby gave the plaintiff in December
of 1991?
A:

He indicated that he should have his dentition,

or his teeth restored to normal health, and that would
involve a good cleaning, and instruction of oral hygiene, to
remove non-restored teeth, and restoration of the restorable
teeth. He also indicated he ought to have tomograms of the
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TMJ's to asses for structural abnormalities, after which he
should be evaluated for splint therapy. And he indicated at
this point that conservative therapy would probably be all
that was required.
Q:

Right. And that's in the second paragraph he

said, 'It is my feeling that conservative treatment will be all
that will be needed.' Is that correct?
A:

That's what he indicated.

Q:

And conservative treatment is similar to what

your treatment plan was of soft diet, heat, and splint
therapy?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And the splint therapy would cost between $300

and $400?
A:

In my office.

Q:

With regard to these recommendations, and

when you examined the plaintiff, did he follow, from your
examination, any of the recommendations set forth by Dr.
Cosby?
A:

It did not appear that he had.

Q:

Now, with regard to surgery, he indicated that

he, quote, may need surgery sometime in the future. Is that
an accurate description of your testimony?
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A:

That is.

Q:

And isn't it true that you would not cross the

bridge of surgery, so to speak, until after you have had an
opportunity to treat this individual conservatively for three
or four months?
A:

In my office we begin treatment conservatively,

and if the patient does not respond, then we seek other
methods of treatment, which would include surgery.
Q:

Right.

But you do the conservative treatment

and hope the patient will respond?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And that will be enough, correct?

A:

Yes, we hope so.

(R. 849-850)
Again, no one will know whether Dalton would have responded to
conservative treatment performed by Dr. Mikesell and whether the "bridge of
surgery" would ever have to be crossed because Dalton did not follow Dr.
Mikesell's recommendations. The jury was correct in determining that credible
evidence was presented at trial rebutting Dalton's assertions that future
surgeries would be necessary.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED COSTS IN
EXCESS OF THOSE ALLOWED BY STATUTE

Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Herold filed
a n offer of judgment in the amount of $15,000. That offer was rejected by
Dalton.

Rule 68(b) states:
... If the judgment finally obtained by the offerree is not
more favorable than the offer, the offerree m u s t pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer. ...

The jury awarded an amount less than the offer of judgment filed by Herold.
Herold did not seek the payment of any costs but contended that Dalton also
should not be awarded costs.
Rule 68 is designed to encourage parties to make and accept reasonable
settlement offers.

It is obvious that the $15,000 offered by Herold was

reasonable in light of the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs such as Dalton should not
be awarded costs when they refuse to accept reasonable settlement offers. In
the case at hand, liability was primarily against Herold.

In such cases, the

plaintiff will undoubtedly be the "prevailing party" and could be awarded
costs.

Public policy would argue that a plaintiff t h a t does not accept a

reasonable offer of judgment should not be awarded costs.

In this case,

neither of the parties should be awarded costs.
Despite Herold's arguments, the trial court awarded Dalton $2,330.00 in
costs. In the alternative of awarding no costs to Dalton, the following costs
should not be awarded Dalton, or modified, under any circumstance:
Travel expenses re: depositions of Herold and Dalton -
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$ 573.00

Court reporter fee for Newell Knight's deposition -

$ 188.90

Process server's fees, witness fees, and mileage Newell Knight (depo)

$ 125.00

Dr. Warren Stadler (depo)

$ 400.00

Dr. Warren Stadler (service)

$

43.00

Dr. Vaun Mikesell (service)

$

37.00

Dr. James Morgan (service)

$

35.00

Dr. Richard Hodnett (service)

$

45.00

Officer Mike Roberts (service)

$

30.00

Total:

$1,476.90

(R. 453)
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771,
773 (Utah 1980):

"Costs were not recoverable at common law; and are

therefore generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided
by statute." Utah Code Annotated allows for a taxing of costs for serving a
subpoena upon a witness.

Section 21-2-4(1) and (4) of the Utah Code

Annotated provides that the sheriff shall receive a fee of $6.00 for serving a
subpoena and $1.00 for each mile necessarily traveled, in going only. Section
21-5-4 allows the payment of witnesses $17.00 per day and "if traveling more
than 50 miles, $1.00 for each four miles in excess of 50 miles actually and
necessarily traveled in going only."
Dalton was awarded as costs a minimum of $30.00 for the service of a
subpoena for a witness to appear at trial. As such, the individual would have
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to reside 24 miles from the courthouse for that amount to be justified.

In

addition, Dalton was awarded costs for service of subpoenas on Dalton's own
expert witnesses. Those costs should be modified.
Dalton was awarded $525.00 as costs for the witness fees associated
with the taking of Herold's expert's depositions, Newell Knight and Dr.
Stadler.

The statutes only allow the payment of $17.00 as witness fees.

Dalton's award of costs should be accordingly reduced. The remainder of the
money paid by Dalton is an expense of litigation which is not properly taxable
as costs. Id. at 774.
Finally, Dalton was awarded as costs the expense of traveling to
Portland to take the deposition of Herold and to Denver to defend the
deposition of Dalton. Such travel expenses are not recoverable as costs. The
court abused its discretion when it awarded those costs.
CONCLUSION
Although not all the evidence was favorable to Herold, clearly sufficient
competent evidence existed to enable the jury to arrive at its verdict for
damages and accordingly the jury's verdict should stand.

Batty v. Mitchell

575 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1978). Based on the foregoing, Herold urges this
court to overturn the trial court's award of additur and reinstate the jury's
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award of damages as the final judgment in this case, without an award of
costs to any party.
DATED this 27th day of October, 1994.
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Exhibit A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARVIN A. DALTON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
: CASE NO. 920903329
:

BRIAN G. HEROLD,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's
Motion for Additur or New Trial. A hearing was held in this Court
on August 10, 199 3, and argument was heard on the plaintiff's
motion.

The court denied the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and

took the Motion for Additur under advisement. The Court having now
carefully reviewed the relevant law, the memoranda submitted by
counsel, and having considered counsels' arguments, rules as stated
herein.

The Court finds that the amount of the jury's verdict is

inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial, and grants the
Motion for Additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special
damages.

The jury's award of $5,000.00 for general damages is to

remain at that amount.
The Court in assessing the verdict has considered the same in
the light most favorable to the jury's findings. Assessment, under

DALTON V. HEROLD

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

this standard, leads the Court to conclude that the jury's award is
clearly inadequate in light of the evidence presented at trial.
The law is clear that although a trial judge may assess the
evidence

differently

than

a jury, mere disagreement

sufficient reason to order a new trial or an additur.

is not

a

The power of

a trial judge to order a new trial or grant an additur is reserved
for those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence.

Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P. 2d 530 (Utah

1984), and Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958).
Suhrmann, makes
misapplied

or

misunderstood

Bodon v.

it clear that if an award shows that the jury
failed

to

take

into

account

proven

facts,

or

or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly

against the evidence, and the verdict is outside the limits of any
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it should
not be permitted to stand.
remains the law in Utah.
Dupuis v. Nielson,

Although Bodon is a 1958 case, it
Bodon has been cited and reaffirmed in

624 P.2d

685

(Utah 1981),

and

in Mever v.

Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984).
The Bodon case is important to review in relation to the
instant case.

In Bodon, the contention was that the verdict was

outside the limits of what appeared justifiable under the evidence.
The Court ruled, "In such instances the remedy is to order a

DALTON V. HEROLD
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modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence."

Jd

at 828.
This Court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical
expenses to have been undisputed

and uncontroverted

at trial.

During the trial Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell,
expert witnesses called by the plaintiff, testified that the amount
of future medical

expenses, if surgery

occurred (and they both

perceived surgery as necessary), would be, at least, $20,007.00.
Although the defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness,
evidence of the cost of the plaintiff's special damages was not
disputed.
A finding of negligence was made and a review of the Special
Verdict form establishes that the jury concluded that the plaintiff
had

been damaged.

The award

for special damages must bear a

reasonable relationship to the evidence. This Court finds that: the
award of $3,000.00 does not bear this reasonable relationship to
the evidence adduced at trial.

The plaintiff presented evidence

that his oast medical bills were $2,903.24 (see Exhibit 3 ) ; and an
award of $3,000.00, while close to this amount, is greater than the
actual past medical expenses, and not consistent with any actual
special damages.

An additur is therefore granted.

The total

special damages testified to were $22,910.24. The jury's award of

DALTON V. HEROLD
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$3,000,00, is $19,910.24 below this. Additur is therefore granted
in the amount of $19,910.24.

This amount, when added to the

special damage verdict of $3,000.00, equals $22,910.24, which is
consistent with the testimony concerning specials.
The Court now turns its attention to the general damage award.
It is well-settled that general damages must bear a reasonable
relationship to special damages and to the evidence.

General

damages are designed to compensate an injured plaintiff for pain
and suffering and for damages that the plaintiff has incurred over
and above those quantifiable damages such as lost wages and medical
expenses.
clear

Mclntire v. Gray, 593 P.2d 1273 (Or. App. 1979).

that

special

damages

are

assessment than general damages.

more

capable

of

It is

definitive

General damages are by their

nature more subjective and difficult to pin down.

This Court must

view the general damage award in relation to the original special
damage award and determine whether a reasonable relationship exists
between the two.

Where the original award

for specials was

$3,000.00 and the general award was $5,000.00; one cannot conclude
that a reasonable relationship between the two does not exist. The
question of whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to
the

evidence, must

be assessed, with

concerning general damages.

the

case

law

in mind

Case law concerning general damages

indicates that these awards are rarely susceptible of additur.
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Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P. 2d 723 (Utah 1983) , the Court ruled

that juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment
of damages, and that where personal injuries involve a loss of
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there
is no set formula to compute the amount of general damages.
726.

Id. at

In the case of Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, (N.M. App.

1988) , the Court ruled that "there is no standard fixed by law for
measuring the value of pain and suffering/ rather the amount to be
awarded is left to the fact finder's judgment."

And, in another

case, Cartwriaht v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 593 P.2d 104
(Okl.

App.

1988)

it was held

that

compensation

for pain

and

suffering rests in the sound discretion of the jury, since there is
no market where pain and suffering are bought and sold, nor any
standard by which compensation

can be definitely ascertained, or

the amount actually suffered determined.
This analysis leads this Court to conclude that generals and
specials are sufficiently distinct from each other
may be subject to additur without modification of
two are not synonymous nor are they inseparable.

that specials
generals.

The

To illustrate

this concept, the Court notes that a jury is at liberty, in some
circumstances, to award one without the other.

'

,ne issue of

general damages is contested, the jury may conclude that the
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plaintiff did not actually suffer any general damages but did
reasonably incur special damages for medical expenses or loss of
wages.

This

is the case

if the plaintiff's

complaints

are

subjective and his credibility is questioned." Eisele v. Rood, 551
P.2d 441 (Or. 1976).
While this Court was not privy to the jury's deliberations or
exact considerations in arriving at the general damage award, this
Court can only conclude that the jury did not feel that the
plaintiff's entitlement to general damages, i.e., his pain and
suffering, warranted a large amount:.

This Court appreciares the

province of the jury and will not substitute its judgment for that
of the jury in arriving at a general damage award.
In making this ruling, this Court elects to exercise its
supervisory power to ensure justice consistent with the jury's
verdict.
The defendant may accepj: this ruling, or request a new trial.
Dated this

QU

#ay of September^ 1993.

*

LESLIE'tff 132WIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

^--.

"

>

^
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GEORGE T. WADDOUPS #3 965
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

Deputy C;erk

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR.,

)

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
]

vs.

Civil No. 920903329PI
BRIAN G. HEROLD,

]
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.

]

This matter was tried to the jury on May 17th, 18th, and
19th,

1993, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding.

George T.

Waddoups and Karen Thomas represented the plaintiff. Mark Dunn and
Kevin Swenson represented the defendant.
The Court directed a verdict against the defendant and
answered question one on the verdict form.

The jury found that the

defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.

The jury also found the plaintiff was negligent and the

plaintifffs negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.

The jury answered question five by assessing 80% of the

negligence to the defendant Brian Herold and 20% of the negligence
to the plaintiff, Art Dalton.
The jury awarded special damages in the amount of $3f000.
The jury also awarded general damages in the amount of $5,000, for
total

damages

in

the

amount

of

$8,000.

The

verdict

appropriately dated and signed by the jury foreperson.

was

The Court

having inquired of the jury as to its verdict directs the judgment
to be entered in accordance with the verdict and its Memorandum
Decision entered September 22, 1993, and incorporated herein by
reference, which

grants

plaintiff's

additur

in the

additional

amount for specials of $19,910.24:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
Brian Herold, as follows:
1.

The

plaintiff

defendant

is

awarded

for special

judgment

damages

against

in the

the

amount of

$18,328.19 ($3,000 + $19,910.24 X 80%).
2.

The

plaintiff

is

awarded

judgment

against

the

defendant for pre-judgment interest of past special
damages in the amount of $794.40 pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-44.

This sum represents interest

at 10% per annum on $2,400 from October 15, 1990
through September, 1993.

2
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GEORGE T. WADDOUPS #39 65
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4 252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 34107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

by

p.*rmm*

Oen-t'v O w n

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'1!
POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR
VERIFIED COSTS AND EXPENSES

vs.
BRIAN G. HEROLD,
Defendant.
The
expenses

plaintiff's

incurred

1
]

Civil No. 920903329PI

1
]

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

motion

for an

in the preparation

award

for trial

for cost
of the above-

entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, August 10, 1993 at
2:45 p.m., the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding.
was represented by George Waddoups.

The plaintiff

The defendant was represented

by Mark Dunn.
The Court having reviewed the written memoranda submitted
by the parties, the appropriate sections of the Utah Code cited in
plaintiff's memoranda and defendant's memorandum, and the case law
cited therein, and having listened to oral argument presented by
counsel,

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the following costs are
awarded to plaintiff:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Filing fee
Travel expenses Re:
depositions of Herold
and Dalton
Court reporter fees (depo.)
Brian Herold
Art Dalton
Newell Knight
Dr. Warren Stadler
Dr. Vaun Mikesell
Dr. James Morgan
Dr. Richard Hodnett
Process server's fees, witness
fees, and mileage
Newell Knight (depo.)
Dr. Warren Stadler (depo.)
Dr. Warren Stadler (service)
Dr. Vaun Mikesell (service)
Dr. James Morgan (service)
Dr. Richard Hodnett (service)
Officer Mike Roberts (service)

$

120.00

SUBTOTAL:

$ 2,330.00

PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON
SPECIAL DAMAGES (10% per
annum on $2,400 from
10/15/90 - 9/93):

$

573.00 X.
258.75
169.95
188.90 X
194.15
62.50
34.50
13.25
125.00X
400.00*
43.00*
37.00X
35.00X
45.00X
30.00 *

794.40

TOTAL COSTS, EXPENSES AND
INTEREST:

$ 3,124.40

The Court denies plaintiffs motion in regard to the
expenses

and

costs

reconstructionist.

as

to

Ron

Probert,

an

accident

However, the Court orders that Mr. Probert

provide a detailed itemization of his fees, costs, and expenses
incident to this litigation, and orders the defendant to pay for
the fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Mr. Probert to testify at
2

the hearing which was held in-camera by this Court,
is to bear the fees, costs, and expenses

The plaintiff

looen. j i i i
" " .>

Mr. Probert preparing and testifying in-camera before this Court on
the i ssi le c )f 1 is expertise regardingyh^lmets and motorcycles.
DATED this

>r4"7

day of _

199;rl^^^-w-' o
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C^fc^slie A. Lewis < V ^ O O T ^ ^ ?
Third District Court "tfo^JL^*^
Approved

»rm:

Mark D. Dunn
Attorney for Defendant
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Surgery

HAEL P CCS3Y. D.O.S.. M D.
DAL B.JAMES. O.O.S.
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26 December 1991

George WaddouDS, Esauire
4252 S. 700 East

S a l t Lake City, UT
Regarding:

84107

Marvin Dalton

Dear Mr. WaddouDs:
The above p a t i e n t was seen by me for evaluation of TMJ-type symptoms on
1 2 / 1 6 / 9 1 . He presented with a chief complaint of pain with chewing and
popping of the jaws.
The h i s t o r y of h i s present i l l n e s s , he r e l a t e s being in a motorcycle a c c i dent on 10/16/90 a t which time he sustained multiple f a c i a l injuries - p r i mary to the r i g h t side of his face. He r e l a t e s having fractures (blow-out
t y p e ) . Since the accident, he r e l a t e s his bite i s off and has noticed
popping of the r i g h t TMJ. He has been having headaches - primarily related
to t h e l e f t temple region but sometimes involving the right temporal. The
pain r e l a t e d to h i s TMJ i s primarily related to b i t i n g . Apparently, when
chewing, he experiences pain in the pre-auricular area over the zygomatic
arcn and i n t o the rempie areas as well. The pain i s on the r i g h t side
o n l y . Apparently, he experiences t h i s type pain on a daily basis which
l a s t s 30 to 60 seconds. He also r e l a t e s noticing decreased opening of his
mouth.
On physical examination, he has a maximum i n n e r - i n c i s a l opening of 44 mm.
with p a i n .
The pain he experiences with man mum opening i s to the right
p r e - a u r i c u l a r and right masseter regions. He has a Class I occlusion on
the r i g h t and Class II on the l e f t . To palpation, he^is tender over the
r i g h t TMJ and temporalis muscle. To palpation, t h e r e i s no clicking or
^
popping detected. There i s no crepitus noted. Tooth #7 has been fractured,
and i t appears only the root i s remaining. He has other carious teeth in
h i s mouth - primarily the l e f t mandibular molar which i s decayed down to
the r o o t s . There i s moderate periodontal disease with a f a i r amount of

TP
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George v\"addoups. Esquire
25 December 1991
Page II.
Re:

Marvin Dalton

calculus around the anterior mandibular teeth. A tentative diagnosis would
be myalgia related to the muscles of mastication. There is a working diagnosis of internal derangement of cha ITU en tha right: moderate periodontal
disease; dental decay and fracture of tooth #7,
Recommendation:
It is my recommendation the patient have his dentition restored to a more
nornal health. This would most likely involve good prophylaxis and instruction on oral hygiene; the removal of non-restored teeth and restoration of
restorable teeth. After the occlusion is in a more functional, state, the patient
should have corrected tomograms of the THJ's to assess any structural abnormalities, after which he should be evaluated for splint therapy. It is my
feeling conservative treatment would be all that would be needed. Most likely!
splint therapy would alleviate most of the myalgia and symptoms of TMJ dysfunction which he is experiencing.
Hopefully, this will help in answering any questions you have regarding this
patient1s TMJ function.
Sincerely,

*ULtJ' (j
MICHAEL P. COSBY, D.D.S., M.D.
jul

